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A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal
Sovereignty
By EARL METTLER*
Introduction
In the rapidly developing field of Indian law, no topic is more fre-
quently the focal point of heated controversy than Indian tribal sover-
eignty. This debate is due not only to the subject's intrinsic
importance in the field, but also to the fact that it is still surrounded by
uncertainty after 200 years of treaties, statutes, and court decisions in
Indian affairs.
The past two centuries have produced three general areas of legal
concern in which sovereignty is considered relevant, but no unified
consensus as to its nature and extent has evolved. The purpose of this
Article is to derive the proper role of sovereignty in each legal context
in which it appears and to interrelate these roles to evolve a theoreti-
cally sound and unified concept of Indian tribal sovereignty.
The three distinct subject-matter areas in which sovereignty is an
operative principle, and the confused notion of sovereignty which re-
sults from looking at each of them in isolation, are illustrated by the
arguments presented in O4:phant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,1 recently
decided by the Supreme Court. The issue in Oi&Ohant was whether an
Indian tribe had jurisdiction to try a non-Indian for a crime committed
on its reservation. The Suquamish Tribe argued that sovereignty gave
it the power to exercise jurisdiction. 2 The State of South Dakota, as
amicus, argued that sovereignty is only a tool for measuring the extent
of state jurisdiction over Indians.3 The State of Washington, another
* B.S., 1971, South Dakota State University; J.D., 1974, L.L.M., 1978, Georgetown
University Law Center, member of the South Dakota, Washington D.C., New Mexico, and
Navajo Nation Bars.
1. 98 S. Ct. 1011 (1978).
2. Brief for Respondent at 8-9, 11-15.
3. Brief for State of South Dakota at 7-10. The State noted, however, that in this area
sovereignty has given way to a preemption analysis. For a discussion of this debate, see
notes 146-217 & accompanying text infra.
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amicus, argued that sovereignty is only a tool for upholding Indian-
affairs legislation against equal protection challenges.4 The role of
sovereignty in each of these three areas, tribal power, state jurisdiction
and equal protection, will be discussed in turn. A unified and compre-
hensive theory of sovereignty will then be postulated.
Tribal Sovereignty and Tribal Power
The Constitutional Basis
Direct Reference to the Tribes
At the outset, determining whether tribal sovereignty is conferred
or recognized by the Constitution is essential. One direct reference in
the Constitution to Indian tribes provides that "Congress shall have
Power [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes."5 This provision simply
grants regulatory power to the federal government. In contrast to the
tenth amendment, which specifically divides power between the federal
government, the states and the people,6 and omits any reference to In-
dian tribes, this provision does not confer or reserve any tribal power.
At the time of the constitutional convention, and for several de-
cades thereafter, Indian tribes were not yet completely within the fed-
eral system; 7 hence there was no question of whether the tribes should
4. Brief for State of Washington at 11.
5. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The two other constitutional references to Indians,
which are not references to Indian tribes, are the "Indians not taxed" provisions. Id. § 2, cl.
3; id. amend. XIV, § 2.
6. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id. amend. X.
7. During this period the position of the tribes with respect to the federal system was
such that they were not entirely foreign and independent, but neither were they completely
subjugated and within the system. The tribes were still an alien force to be reckoned with.
"In many regions where settlement impinged on their territory, the tribes were a force that
commanded respect, and a people struggling to create a new nation was in no position to stir
up needless hostility. Expediency, if no other cause, almost required that sound relations be
maintained." D. McNICKLE, THE INDIAN TRIBES OF THE UNITED STATES 28 (1962) [here-
inafter cited as McNICKLE]. See also N. FEY & D. McNICKLE, INDIANS AND OTHER
AMERICANS 51-52, 63 (1959) [hereinafter cited as FEY & McNICKLE]. The tribes were not
able to maintain this imposing status as the nation grew westward. "In later years the ten-
dency was to forget those early years of colonial and national experience, when settlement
often could proceed only with the consent of the Indians of a region, and Indian adherence
to an agreement was prayerfully sought. Forgetting those earlier times, the tendency was to
hold Indian treaties in contempt. Andrew Jackson himself, before he became Chief Execu-
tive, reflected the sentiment. Writing to President Monroe, in 1817, he declared: 'I have
long viewed treaties with the Indians an absurdity not to be reconciled to the principles of
our government."' McNICKLE, supra, at 34-35. See also FEY & McNICKLE, supra, at 91-
92. "The same doctrine was bluntly set forth by Jackson's attorney general, John M. Ber-
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have independent power within that system. From the time of the Arti-
cles of Confederation 8 through the constitutional convention,9 the pre-
dominant issue appears to have been only whether Indians and Indian
tribes would be subject to state or federal regulation. There was no
concern with whether to accord an independent status to the tribes
within the constitutional framework. Thus, when the tribes eventually
became fully subject to federal power, they "entered" the federal sys-
tem without a constitutionally defined place. Their status under the
Constitution is that of separate entities, recognized as such by the com-
merce clause, but entities without defined governmental authority be-
cause no power was delegated to or recognized as residing within the
tribes under the tenth amendment. In addition, although the issue of
whether state or federal law should govern the tribes was resolved in
favor of the federal government in the commerce clause, the division of
power in the tenth amendment implies that once a tribal member left
the tribe, or a tribe itself became disestablished, state law would govern
the individual member.
The treaty power
The power granted to the President and the Senate to make trea-
tiesI0 is considered to be a constitutional provision implicitly dealing
with the status of Indian tribes."1 Now, however, the provision must
rien, who insisted that the United States had granted peace to the Cherokees in 1785 as a
'mere grace of the conqueror.' The argument might have sounded plausible in 1830, but it
should be considered in light of the actions of the Continental Congress in 1783 and the
years following, when a most nervous anxiety to get peace signed with the Indians was
indicated. Congress did not look much like a conqueror imposing terms on the conquered
Indians. She was seeking to keep the Indians at peace at all costs, rather than risk any more
hostilities, which the new weak nation could ill afford." F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 236-37 (1962) (footnote omitted).
8. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation gave Congress the right to regulate trade
and manage affairs with the Indians as long as there was no infringement of state legislative
power.
9. The constitutional convention limited federal power to the regulation of commerce
only, and deleted language concerning Indians who were subject to state law. James
Madison introduced a proposal giving Congress power to "regulate affairs with the Indians
as well within as without the limits of the United States." A committee narrowed this to
give Congress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states, and with the Indians, within the limits of any state, not subject to the laws thereof."
F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARs 42 (1962). The deletion
of any reference to state authority was deemed significant by Chief Justice Marshall in
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-59 (1832).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
11. The commerce and treaty making powers and the power to make war were said to
confer upon the federal government "all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse
with the Indian tribes." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
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be read together with the Act of March 3, 1871, which provided that the
United States would no longer make treaties with Indian tribes:
"[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty
.... ,,"2 Cessation of the practice of treating with the tribes reflects
the historical developments that occurred between 1789 and 1871. The
demographics of the growing nation had changed dramatically, with
the eastern tribes subjugated and removed, and total Indian land hold-
ings greatly reduced. 13 Legally, the tribes were no longer dealt with as
partially outside and separate from the federal system,' 4 but rather as
having come fully within it. 15
12. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976)).
13. The effect of the events of the times upon many of the southern, eastern and Great
Lakes tribes has been summarized as follows: "In the succeeding ten years [after 1830] the
Atlantic and Gulf States were cleared of the Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, and
Seminoles ....
The Ohio River and Great Lakes tribes were also rounded up and removed ....
...Hardly had some of the tribes settled down, in Kansas, Iowa, and Nebraska, than
they were told they could not stay ....
The tribes from the south-east, now come to be designated the Five Civilised Tribes
because of the progress they had made in adopting the white man's culture, establishing
schools, courts, tax systems, and formal governments, they too found that perpetuity had a
short life." McNICKLE, supra note 7, at 40-41. During the 50 years following 1830, the
"geography of the country [was] dramatically altered and Indian occupancy reduced to
something rather similar to its present land base." Chambers, Judicial Enforcement ofthe
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1223 (1975). See also FEY &
McNICKLE, supra note 7, at 93.
14. For a discussion of the relationship between the events of the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury and the 1871 statute, see McNICKLE, supra note 7, at 44; Note, The Indian Bill of Rights
and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Note].
15. The direct impetus for the 1871 statute was the desire of the House of Representa-
tives to have an equal role with the Senate in the formulation of Indian policy. Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 202 (1975). The statute had direct application only to the ques-
tion of how Congress would henceforth deal with the tribes. Id. at 203. See also Hearings
on the Constitutional Rights of American Indians Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Comm on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 [hereinafter cited as 1961
Hearings], in which an Interior Department official remarked that "the legal philosophy
that a tribe constituted an autonomous dependent group for other purposes remained
unchanged."
Although the statute did not affect the federal power over Indian affairs and did not
destroy the tribes as autonomous groups for all purposes, it did reflect the diminished posi-
tion in which the tribes had been placed. McNICKLE, supra note 7, at 44; FEY &
McNICKLE, supra note 7, at 59. For whatever reasons, Congress prohibited "recognition of
Indian nations and tribes as sovereign independent nations." Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 194, 201 (1975). The Act thus confirms the fact that the tribes had come fully within
the federal system. The federal government would no longer recognize them as external
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Discontinuance of treating with the tribes in 1871 is a practical
illustration that the Constitution does not require continuing recogni-
tion of tribes as governmental entities.' 6 The present relevance of the
treaty power lies in the broad legislative power regarding Indian affairs
conferred on Congress by past treaties. 17 Areas of activity arguably
outside the scope of the commerce power were entered upon by the
federal government under the treaty-making power. These areas are
now appropriate subjects for congressional enactments. 18 Thus the
treaty clause has come to be a source of federal legislative power over
Indian affairs.19
Moreover, Congress may, by statute, modify or completely abro-
gate treaties, 20 or continue them in force. In the 1871 Act, Congress
provided for the general continuation of treaties already in force.2 In
theory, any element of tribal sovereignty expressly or impliedly recog-
nized in the treaties remained in force after the 1871 Act. If a treaty
made before 1871 provided for tribal self-government, the right of self-
government was continued. If a treaty contained or implied a recogni-
tion of some lesser kind or degree of tribal sovereignty, that sovereignty
was continued. 22 Thus, when the tribes came fully within the federal
system, most of them retained, by consent of Congress, some degree of
sovereignty.
While the Constitution did not itself guarantee tribal sovereignty,
it provided the means by which the federal government could choose to
recognize tribal governmental authority. The federal government did
in fact treat with the tribes as sovereign entities until 1871, when it
determined that tribes would not be recognized as sovereigns prospec-
tively. Varying degrees of sovereignty, as embodied in particular trea-
sovereigns, but would allow them to retain some degree of autonomy by legislative grace.
This change indicates a congressional recognition and adoption of the principle that "Indian
tribes--brought into our system by force and continuing geographically apart from other
citizens-are culturally much more different from mainstream America than any other
group within our system."
16. The same can be said of several later statutes, which abolish tribal organizations or
reduce tribal powers. See notes 24-54 & accompanying text infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 221-85 infra.
18. A prior treaty may have the effect of conferring upon Congress legislative power
which it would not otherwise possess. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
19. See note 11 supra.
20. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
21. See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
22. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1958), held that the 1868 treaty with the
Navajos contained an implied grant of tribal governmental power over internal affairs, and
that the treaty right "survived" the 1871 Act. Id. at 221 n.7.
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ties, are continued to the present day, unless modified by subsequent
statutes.
Legislative Treatment
The Trade and Intercourse Acts
The history of congressional dealings with Indian tribes reflects
the inconsistency in attitudes among the American people toward the
Indian tribes. Before the 1871 Act, the most significant legislative acts
relating to tribal government were the Trade and Intercourse Acts, en-
acted between 1790 and 1834. The acts provided for the licensing of
Indian traders, prohibited the sale of lands by Indians without federal
consent, and established a scheme for the regulation of criminal con-
duct in Indian country.23 These acts were an early and comprehensive
exercise by the federal government of the power to regulate Indian af-
fairs recently conferred by the Constitution. The content of the acts
reflects the relatively foreign position the tribes occupied with respect
to the federal system. The acts were designed to minimize and regu-
late contact between settlers and Indians. When westward expansion
rendered the policies of isolation, containment, and removal inade-
quate, the General Allotment Act was passed to inaugurate a new fed-
eral policy.
The Allotment Acts
The General Allotment Act of 188724 had a major impact on tribal
government and embodied the dominant federal Indian policy for ap-
proximately five decades. It provided for the allotment of tribally held
lands in severalty to individual Indians. The allotments were to be
held in trust for the individuals by the federal government, with restric-
tions on the individual's right to use and alienate the land, for a period
of twenty-five years. The "surplus" land in a reservation that was not
required for the allotments was opened to settlement by non-Indians.
Individual Indian allottees were declared American citizens, and were
to become subject to state law when the twenty-five year trust period
23. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161,4 Stat. 729; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139;
Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743 (expired); Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469
(expired); Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329 (repealed); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1
Stat. 137 (obsolete). Seegeneraly F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMA-
TIVE YEARS (1962).
24. General Allotment Act of 1887, cl. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-
334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 381 (1976)).
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ended.25
The General Allotment Act provided that the President could
make allotments on any reservation.26 In some cases, a treaty already
included a provision allowing for allotments to be made in the future.27
Usually, Congress did not wait for the President to act under the Gen-
eral Allotment Act or treaties, but passed a specific statute directing the
making of allotments on a particular reservation and the opening of the
surplus lands to settlement. Such acts were the normal congressional
response for the forces of westward expansion. In many cases, Con-
gress disestablished a reservation or portion of a reservation by the
opening legislation, although not every surplus-land act had this
effect. 28
In some treaties, the provision for possible future allotments re-
quired tribal consent to the allotment process. In Lone Wolf v.
Hichcock,29 the Supreme Court held that Congress could unilaterally
make allotments and open surplus lands without the tribal consent
specified by a treaty. Although the tribal lands were sometimes allot-
ted without tribal consent, there normally was some provision made for
compensation to the tribe.30
The allotment acts were intended to achieve the dissolution of tri-
bal governments and the assimilation of Indians into the federal/state
25. Id. § 6.
26. Id. § 1.
27. E.g., Treaty with the Sioux, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, art. VI; Treaty with the
Yancton Sioux, April 19, 1858, 11 Stat. 743, art. X; Treaty with the Washington Tribes, Jan.
22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927, art. VII. In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587 (1977),
the relevant treaty did not mandate allotments but required the consent of the members of
the tribe before tribal land could be allotted. See also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553 (1903).
28. Compare Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) and DeCoteau v.
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) with Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) and
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). The Congressional Record during the
period of these statutes contains numerous clear statements that the policy of the era was to
partially or completely disestablish the reservations. Eg., 19 CONG. REc. 1928 (1888); 26
CONG. REc. 6236, 7689-697 (1894); 36 CONG. Rlc. 1278-281 (1903); see Comment, New
Town, et al: The Future of an Illusion, 18 S.D.L. REv. 85 (1973).
29. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
30. In some cases the land was made available on a "free homestead" basis, while in
others the settlers were required to make payments in order to claim the land. The pay-
ments made were normally placed in an account to be held in trust for the members of the
tribe. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 432 (1975). Regarding the man-
agement of the trust account, see Note, Indian Tribal Trust Funds, 27 HASTINGs L.J. 519
(1975).
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governmental structure as individual citizens. 31 By unilaterally di-
recting the disposal of tribal lands, Congress verified that there is no
right of tribal self-government enforceable against the federal govern-
ment. Like the 1871 statute, the allotment acts did not remove de jure
any tribal powers or any particular elements of sovereignty the tribes
possessed. In terms of practical effect, however, the allotment acts
dealt tribal government a more debilitating blow than had the 1871
statute, which expressly ended the tribes' sovereign status prospectively.
The acts also reflected the growing desire of the states to legislate
as to matters of state concern within state territory. In fact, the most
significant general legislation regarding Indians between 1887 and the
1930's authorized the states to enforce state health, sanitation, and
school-attendance laws on reservations and tribal lands.32
The Indian Reorganization Act
The next general legislation dealing with tribal power was the In-
dian Reorganization Act of 1934.33 The Act gave tribes authority to
adopt constitutions and corporate charters. 34 The Secretary of the In-
terior was given authority to restore surplus lands to tribal ownership,35
to create new reservations, 36 and to acquire land in trust for Indians.37
Further allotment of tribal lands was prohibited.
The Reorganization Act was intended to preserve38 and "stabilize
the tribal organization ... with real, though limited, authority. ' 39
Section 16 of the Act provided as follows:
31. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 432 (1975). See also note 28
supra.
32. 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1976).
33. Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79
(1976)).
34. Id. §§ 476-77.
35. Id. § 463.
36. Id. § 467.
37. Id. § 465.
38. Id. §§ 461-77. The Act clearly was intended to enhance tribal government in the
short run. It is not clear, however, whether it was intended to preserve tribal government
permanently. Both the Meriam Report, which resulted from a study requested by the gov-
ernment, and a summary of the Roosevelt Administration policy adopted the goal of facili-
tating the economic advancement of Indians so that they would be "absorbed into the
prevailing civili[z]ation" as "an integral part of American life." See McNICKLE, supra note
7, at 56-57. The strengthening of tribal governments may have been intended as only a step
in the process of integration, or it may have been intended to be the permanent means by
which Indians were to take their place in the spectrum of American life. See JOSEPHY,
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY 51 (1971); FEY & McNICKLE, supra note 7, at 132.
39. S. REP. No. 1080, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
[Vol. 30
INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council
by existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest
in such tribe or its tribal council the following rights and powers: To
employ legal counsel . . . to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or
encumbrance of tribal lands... and to negotiate with the Federal,
State, and local Governments. 4°
The exact meaning of this section is not clear from the Act, but it would
appear that powers originally held by tribes that were recognized and
allowed to be retained by treaties or prior statutes, as well as any addi-
tional powers conferred in the same manner, would be retained by
tribes that accepted the terms of the 1934 Act. This provision made it
clear to tribes choosing to come under the Act that they would not be
giving up powers derived from other laws.4' The provision is consis-
tent with the act's purpose of enhancing tribal government in that it
recognized and reconfirmed those powers a tribe may already have had
as a government.
Section 16 is also completely consistent with the 1871 statute
quoted above. Both statutes prescribed a new prospective role for the
tribal entities without removing whatever rights and powers had been
conferred upon or allowed to be retained by each tribe in the past. By
enacting comprehensive legislation establishing and defining powers of
tribes, Congress once again exercised its power to regulate tribal affairs
without interference from any constitutional right of tribal sovereignty.
Public Law 280 and the Termination Acts
A partial exercise of the congressional power over tribal govern-
ment occurred in the 1940's and 1950's when Congress conferred lim-
ited jurisdiction over reservation Indians upon certain states.42 In
1953, Congress passed the law that is now commonly referred to as
"Public Law 280," giving federal consent to states that desired to ac-
quire civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribal Indians.43
40. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976).
41. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085, 1086 n.4 (8th Cir. 1977).
42. Crain v. First Natl Bank, 324 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963). See also Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S.
404 (1968).
43. Act of June 8, 1940, Pub. L. No. 565, 54 Stat. 249 (repealed 1948) (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (1976)) (Kansas); Act of May 31, 1946, Pub. L. No. 394; 60 Stat. 229
(North Dakota); Act of June 30, 1948, Pub. L. No. 846, 62 Stat. 1161 (Iowa); Act of July 2,
1948, Pub. L. No. 881, 62 Stat. 1224 (New York). By the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No.
280, 67 Stat. 588, Congress conferred full or partial jurisdiction as to both criminal offenses
and civil causes of action arising within Indian country upon California, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Oregon and Wisconsin. Alaska was added to this list by the Act of Aug. 8, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545. Regarding the experience in California, see Note, The
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In the 1950's and 1960's, Congress exercised the power to regulate
Indian affairs in a manner even less hospitable to tribal governments.
Under various "termination acts," the tribal governmental authority of
specified tribes was completely extinguished. 44 While the policy of
those acts has subsequently come into disfavor,45 the acts have been
held to be constitutionally valid.46 It is evident, then, that tribal sover-
eignty as an independent right of self-government exists only by au-
thority and permission of Congress. Termination could not have taken
place if a constitutional right of tribal sovereignty existed.
The Indian Civil Rights Act
In an attempt to reverse federal hostility towards tribal self-gov-
ernment while bolstering rights of tribal members,47 Congress passed
the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968. This Act made provisions similar
to those in the Bill of Rights applicable to Indian tribal government. 48
This Act restricted tribal sovereignty by imposing limitations on the
manner in which tribal powers could be exercised; it did not, however,
destroy specific sovereign powers a tribe might possess. From the
broad guarantees of individual rights imposed upon tribal governments
it can be implied that Congress recognized that the tribes had general
governmental powers. The relatively insignificant powers enumerated
in the 1934 Reorganization Act and conferred upon tribes would not
have required any guarantees of the type imposed by the Civil Rights
Act; obviously, general governmental powers were considered to be
among the powers "vested . . . by existing law" in most tribes.49
Extension of County Jurisdiction over Indian Reservations in California: Public Law 280 and
the Ninth Circuit, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1451 (1974).
44. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588. The Act was amended in 1968
to require that an affected tribe consent to assumption of jurisdiction by a state pursuant to
this federal consent. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 78 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1976)).
45. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1976) (Klamath tribe); 25 U.S.C. § 691 (1976) (Western Ore-
gon Indians); 25 U.S.C. § 741 (1976) (Paiutes); 25 U.S.C. § 891 (1976) (Menominees); 25
U.S.C. § 971 (1976) (Poncas). Various treaties that provided for allotment of tribal lands to
members and dissolution of the tribe also evidence the federal power to completely termi-
nate the tribal entity. See, e.g., Treaty with the Ottowas and Chippewas, July 31, 1855, 11
Stat. 621; Treaty with the Wyandottes, Jan. 31, 1855, 10 Stat. 1159.
46. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 387-89 (1976); MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT
NIXON TO CONGREss, JULY 8, 1970, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
47. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 1679-80 (1978).
48. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976). The Bill of Rights itself does not apply to Indian tribes.
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); cf United States v. Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. 1079 (1978)
(double jeopardy does not bar federal prosecution after tribal court trial for lesser included
offense).
49. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976). Indeed, at least one staff document prepared in connection
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The focus of the Civil Rights Act was upon the rights, particularly
constitutional rights, of American Indian tribal members. The Act,
however, applies to any person affected by the exercise of tribal
power.50 The congressional understanding behind the Act seems to
have been that tribes had extensive power over their members and
some unspecified power over nonmembers.5 1 The criminal jurisdic-
tion provisions of the Intercourse Act amendments had placed crimes
in Indian country under federal jurisdiction, except that the tribes had
jurisdiction over crimes between their own members and "any case"
where jurisdiction was given to the tribe by treaty.52 The reference to
"any case" indicates that some tribes may have been given jurisdiction
by treaty over crimes committed by nonmembers,5 3 along with the full
criminal jurisdiction the tribes exercised over their members.54 In the
recent case of Oiphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,55 the Supreme
Court deemed the purpose of the application of the ICRA to non-Indi-
ans to have been to cover special cases where jurisdiction over non-
Indians was conferred upon a tribe by treaty or statute.5 6
Summary
The Constitution and statutes show that Indian tribes, while recog-
nized as separate entities by the Constitution, do not have constitution-
ally guaranteed powers as sovereigns, enforceable against the two
sovereigns of the federal system. Through the Constitution, the states
with the Indian Civil Rights Act subscribed to the theory that tribal powers are inherent and
retained unless limited by federal action: "Treaties, applicable State and Federal law, and
the body of relevant administrative law and practice are to be viewed, thus, as limitations
on-and not as conferrals of--the powers of tribal government." SUBCOMM. ON CONST.
RiGHTS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 89TH CONG., 2D SESS. SUMMARY REPORT ON
THE CONSrrrtMMONAL RIGHTS OF AMERICAN INDIANs, 1 (Comm. Print 1966).
50. Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
51. No hearings were held on possible infringement of the rights of non-Indians by
tribes. In fact, a comment on the Civil Rights Act made the flat statement that the tribes
have no jurisdiction over non-Indians. Note, supra note 14, at 1356-57. The testimony in
the Indian Civil Rights 1961 Hearings, however, on which this statement is based, was actu-
ally to the effect that particular tribal constitutions and codes did not permit the exercise of
nonmember jurisdiction. 1961 Hearings, supra note 15, at 385, 679.
52. Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 25, 10 Stat. 269 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1976)).
53. Some early treaties expressly provided for such jurisdiction. Treaty with the Wy-
andottes, Jan. 21, 1785, art. V, 7 Stat. 16; Treaty with the Cherokees, July 2, 1791, art. VII, 7
Stat. 39.
54. This language has been carried forward and is presently contained in 18 U.S.C. §
1152 (1976).
55. 98 S. Ct. 1011 (1978).
56. Id. at 1014 n.6.
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relinquished their power to negotiate treaties and regulate commerce
with the tribes to the federal government. The federal government rec-
ognized tribal sovereignty in fact in varying degrees. Early on, attrib-
utes of sovereignty were conferred upon tribes or allowed to be
retained by them, through both treaties and legislation, because the
tribes in fact possessed elements of external sovereignty during the pe-
riod of actual hostilities. 57 When the tribes came fully within the fed-
eral system, the federal power to deal with them came to be exercised
entirely by legislation, rather than by treaty. The attributes of sover-
eignty which are retained are retained by Congressional permission.
Judicial Interpretations
The early period
The Supreme Court generally has kept pace with the changing at-
titude of the federal government toward the tribes, as outlined by the
Constitution and statutes. No real question of constitutional tribal sta-
tus could exist while a relatively weak federal government tried to
make peace with the strong, hostile, and distinctly sovereign tribes.
While the status of the tribes during the beginning of the expan-
sionist period is best described, with the benefit of hindsight, as in a
state of flux, it was not necessarily so perceived at the time. The diffi-
culty in defining the tribes' status as late as 1831 is reflected in the
opinions in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.58 The issue was whether the
tribe was a "foreign state" for purposes of the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Marshall
held that the tribe was a state in that it had powers of sovereignty over
its members and affairs, but that it was not a foreign state, being within
the jurisdictional limits of the congressional power to regulate com-
merce.5 9 Marshall also noted that the tribe was partly dependent upon
the federal government under the terms of its treaties, and called it a
"domestic dependent nation. '60 The dissent by Justice Thompson
agreed that the tribe was sovereign on its remaining lands, but dis-
agreed that it was a domestic dependent nation, finding it to be a for-
eign state.61 Finally, the concurrences of Justices Johnson and
Baldwin maintained that the tribe was completely conquered and no
57. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (1971).
58. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
59. Id. at 16-17.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 53.
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longer a sovereign state.62 It could, therefore, regain its sovereign sta-
tus only by departing entirely from the domain of the conqueror.63
Thus, one view found the tribe to be a sovereign, foreign to the federal
system; one found it to be completely within the federal system and no
longer sovereign; and the opinion of the Court found a compromise
status for the tribe, and a federal-tribal relationship "perhaps unlike
that of any other two people in existence." 64 Justice Marshall's opin-
ion coincides with the interpretation of the status of the tribes under the
Constitution discussed above:65 the tribes were separate governmental
entities which were sovereign as to internal affairs, but which possessed
no external authority and consequently were subject to regulation by
the federal government under the commerce clause. In Worcester v.
Georgia,66 Justice Marshall also addressed the question of the tribes'
status under the tenth amendment division of powers.
In Cherokee Nation the tribe had sought to enjoin enforcement of
certain state statutes. In Worcester v. Georgia, a non-Indian was pros-
ecuted for violating one of these statutes, a Georgia law governing ac-
tivities within the territory of the Cherokee. The state statutes were
held unconstitutional under the supremacy clause, as inconsistent with
treaties and the Intercourse Acts.67 The treaties and acts were con-
strued as leaving the tribe a distinct political community with "territo-
rial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive. '68 The
opinion, again written by Marshall, does not explicitly state whether
the tribal powers of self-government were derived directly from the
treaties and statutes, or whether the powers were inherent tribal powers
never divested by the United States. The opinion states that by mak-
ing treaties with the Indians the United States "admits their rank
among those powers who are capable of making treaties, '69 and that
the treaty in question "explicitly recogniz[ed] the national character of
the Cherokees, and their right of self-government." 70 But regardless of
whether the United States conferred the power or merely allowed it to
be retained, the opinion does make it clear that this federal conferral or
62. Id. at 27-28 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 47-50 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 27.
64. Id. at 16.
65. See text accompanying notes 5-22 supra.
66. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
67. Id. at 559-61.
68. Id. at 557.
69. Id. at 559.
70. Id. at 556.
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recognition prevents the states from exercising governmental power.7'
Marshall had rejected the view of Justice Thompson in Cherokee
Nation that the tribes were foreign states outside the federal system
whose sovereignty could have been directly exercised against the states.
Instead, Marshall had held in Cherokee Nation that the tribes were de-
pendent upon and protected by the federal government. In Worcester,
it was this protection that was held to preempt state regulation of In-
dian affairs. Having found the tribes to be domestic, dependent na-
tions instead of foreign states, Marshall now applied the constitutional
division of powers between the states and the federal government to
Indian affairs. 72
The concurring opinion of Justice McLean in Worcester addressed
the problem of federal preemption of Indian affairs in a manner that
recognized the changing status of the tribes as their lands were enclosed
by westward settlement, and the prevailing attitude that favored assim-
ilation of tribal members into the general governmental structure. Jus-
tice McLean agreed with the majority as to the bases of federal
jurisdiction,73 but went on to state that the policy of the federal govern-
ment was to extinguish gradually the independent sovereignty of the
tribes.74 He recognized that the federal government protected the tri-
bal powers of self-government recognized in treaties and law, 75 but
thought that when the tribe had ceased to exercise these powers the
federal preemptive laws would no longer apply. In that event, state
law would govern as to the former tribal members and lands.76 Pre-
emption involved both an empirical determination of the status of a
tribe vis-4-vis the surrounding community, and an interpretation of ap-
plicable laws and treaties.
Justice McLean again applied this empirical approach in United
States v. Cisna,77 a circuit court case that held the Wyandotts' twelve-
square-mile reserve in Ohio had become so integrated with the sur-
rounding non-Indian community that the commerce clause no longer
conferred any power upon Congress with respect to the tribe, so that
71. Id. at 556, 559.
72. See text accompanying notes 146-52 infra.
73. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 578. McLean stated that the Cherokees were "placed by the
federal authority, with but few exceptions, on the same footing as foreign nations." Id. at
581.
74. Id. at 593-94.
75. Id.
76. Id. This result might occur when the tribe was "so degraded or reduced in num-
bers, as to lose the power of self-government." Id. at 593.
77. 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C.D. Ohio 1835) (No. 14,795).
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the 1802 Intercourse Act no longer applied to them.78 Although enun-
ciated in theoretical terms by the court, the basis for this approach may
also be found in the relevant statute. The 1802 Intercourse Act had
provided that it would not apply to "Indians living on lands sur-
rounded by settlements of the citizens of the United States, and being
within the ordinary jurisdiction of any of the individual states." 79
Cisna may be read as interpreting this provision.80 As a general the-
ory, the empirical test for preemption has had little acceptance beyond
this early period. Thus, the Supreme Court recently applied the same
rule to Montana's attempt to tax the relatively assimilated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes.81 Also, in cases presenting the question of whether a
surplus land act disestablished a reservation or merely opened it to
non-Indian settlement, the Supreme Court held that "when Congress
has once established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a
part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress. ' 82 In
rare instances83 when the Court appears to have engaged in an empiri-
cal examination, it has regarded the full original reservation as no
longer being in existence because of either congressional action or the
empirical facts of its subsequent history.84
The empirical test for preemption put forth by Justice McLean
may be regarded primarily as an expression of the recurring federal
78. Id. at 425. A purely empirical approach to the question of criminal jurisdiction
had been used before Worcester and Cisna by Chancellor Kent in Goodell v. Jackson, 6
N.Y. 1164, 20 Johns. 693 (1823). Cisna and Goodell were relied upon in State v. Foreman,
16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 256 (1835), which upheld a Tennessee statute extending state criminal
jurisdiction to crimes committed by Indians in Indian country.
79. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 19, 2 Stat. 139, 145.
80. The Goodell and Foreman cases were both state cases which upheld the application
of state law on various grounds, including necessity. The Foreman case also held that,
based on their empirical situation, the Indians were beyond the constitutional power of Con-
gress to regulate commerce with Indian tribes.
81. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 476 (1976).
82. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909). Congress need not, however,
expressly disestablish a reservation. The intent to do so may be found in the legislative
history and surrounding circumstances of an act of Congress, or may simply be implied
from the passage of an act which is clearly inconsistent with the notion of a continuing
reservation. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
83. See Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165 (1977), where the
Court held that the tribe did not have an exclusive right to conduct "on-reservation" fishing
free of state regulation because the "subsequent history" indicated that the Indians had in
fact alienated nearly all of the original reservation land and did not hold the fishing grounds
for their exclusive use. .d. at 174. The Court did not pass on the continuing existence of
the reservation itself.
84. Id. at 173 n.l1. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); Me-
nominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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policy in favor of assimilation of the tribes, and possibly as a precursor
of the policy of the Allotment Acts of the 1880's. 85 As a general theory
of preemption the empirical test had little acceptance beyond this early
period. The theory correctly perceived a gradual change in the status
accorded the tribes. Subsequent cases, however, have adhered to an
examination of the applicable treaties and laws without considering the
extent to which the tribes are exercising particular powers or preserving
their separateness.
The post-1871 cases
The Supreme Court's acknowledgement of the evolution of tribal
status in relation to the federal government may be illustrated by two
major cases, Ex Parte Crow Dog,86 decided in 1883, and United States
v. Kagama,87 decided three years later. In Crow Dog, the Court ex-
amined the 1868 treaty 88 and the 1877 agreement89 with the Sioux
along with the Intercourse Act of 183490 to determine whether a federal
court could exercise jurisdiction over an Indian who had committed a
crime against another tribal member. The Intercourse Act of 1834 had
applied federal enclave law to Indian country, except as to such
crimes. 91 However, the 1868 treaty with the Sioux contained the fre-
quently used 92 provision that the tribe would "deliver up" to the fed-
eral government for punishment any "bad men among the Indians"
who had committed a crime.93 In addition, the 1877 agreement pro-
vided: "Congress shall, by appropriate legislation, secure to them an
orderly government; they shall be subject to the laws of the United
States, and each individual shall be protected in his rights of property,
person, and life."' 94 The government argued that these provisions re-
pealed the exception contained in the 1834 Intercourse Act and placed
crimes by Indians against Indians under federal jurisdiction as to the
Sioux. The Supreme Court held that the "deliver up" provision did
not apply to cases where both the criminal and the victim were of the
same tribe.95 Further, the Court interpreted the "orderly government"
85. See notes 24-32 & accompanying text supra.
86. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
87. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
88. Treaty with the Sioux, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635.
89. Act of Feb. 28, 1877, ch. 72, 19 Stat. 254.
90. Intercourse Act of July 2, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1976).
92. M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 24 (1973).
93. Treaty with the Sioux, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635.
94. Act of Feb. 28, 1877, ch. 72, 19 Stat. 254, 256.
95. The Court held it "clear from the context that this does not cover" a crime by one
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provision to mean that the United States would allow tribal self-gov-
ernment, not that the United States would govern the tribe directly.9 6
The opinion suggested that one of the bases for this interpretation was
that the tribe was an entity "with whom the United States was con-
tracting as a distinct political body." 97
The Court's acknowledgement of a right of self-government in the
Sioux is consistent both with the interpretation of the constitutional sta-
tus of the tribes advanced above,98 and with the statutory policy of the
time regarding tribal sovereignty. The Court recognized that as long
as the tribes were being dealt with under the commerce clause and the
treaty-making powers, they retained a degree of autonomy relative to
their position as distinct political entities. However, to the extent the
tribe had come within the federal system, federal law would apply, in
accordance with the provisions of the tenth amendment. The extent to
which the tribal right to self-government should be recognized will be
determined by looking to the relevant treaties and statutes.
In Crow Dog, examination of the treaty and consideration of the
fact that the tribe had been dealt with by treaty at all, led to an inter-
pretation of its provisions that favored tribal sovereignty.99 So long as
the treaty was in force and not superseded by a later inconsistent stat-
ute, the sovereignty recognized by the treaty provisions was retained.
This holding illustrates the continuing validity of the treaties under the
provisions of the 1871 act, which continued in effect any powers
granted to or recognized as being retained by the tribes in treaties.100
The Court also determined that the 1834 Intercourse Act similarly rec-
ognized the degree to which the tribes were still beyond the federal
system, by quoting a previous holding that the act applied only to
"those semi-independent tribes whom our government has always rec-
ognized as exempt from our laws."101
tribal member against another. 109 U.S. at 567. Presumably the context was the punish-
ment of persons who had crossed a sort of jurisdictional line-either Indians and non-Indi-
ans committing crimes against each other, or intertribal criminal acts.
96. Id. at 568-69. "[T]he regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs; the
maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their
own laws and customs." Id.
97. Id. at 568.
98. See text accompanying notes 5-22 supra.
99. 109 U.S. at 571-72.
100. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
101. Id. at 572 (quoting United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617 (1876)). The holding
of the Joseph case quoted by the Court regarding the Pueblo Indians was essentially over-
ruled in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). The Sandoval decision stated that
Congress, not the courts, should determine when an Indian tribe should be released from
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A degree of empirical analysis is evident in Crow Dog, as the
Court noted that the Sioux were in basically the same relationship to
non-Indian communities at the time of the decision in 1883 as they had
been at the time of the treaty in 1868. The result of the case was there-
fore appropriate to the facts. Although it is unclear from the discus-
sion in Crow Dog 0 2 whether the treaty and statutory provisions would
have controlled if the tribe had been less independent in 1883 than
when the treaty was signed, the decision in United States v. Kagama10 3
left no doubt that when a tribe enters the federal system any external
sovereignty which the tribe might have possessed is extinguished.
In Kagama, the Supreme Court upheld the Major Crimes Act, °4
passed in response to the Crow Dog decision, and placed under federal
jurisdiction certain serious offenses committed by one Indian against
another. The Court held that the tribes could no longer claim any
sovereignty external to the federal system: "[T]hese Indians are within
the geographical limits of the United States. The soil and the people
within these limits are under the political control of the Government of
the United States, or of the States of the Union. There exists within
the broad domain of sovereignty but these two."110 5 Thus, the tribes
were found to have come within the federal system without occupying
a position of sovereignty therein.
In cases subsequent to Kagama, the Court upheld numerous
federal acts on the basis of the broad federal power over Indian affairs.
For example, in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway,'°6 Ste-
phens v. Cherokee Nation10 7 and Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock,108 the
Court upheld pervasive federal legislation affecting the Cherokees.
The Court attempted to reconcile the exercise of federal power over the
tribe with the language of tribal sovereignty in Worcester, an opinion
written at a time when the Cherokees did in fact possess elements of
sovereignty external to the federal system. By the time of Stephens in
1899, however, they were fully subject to regulation by Congress. 0 9
federal protection. The Pueblos were found to be entitled to federal aid and protection on
the basis of a uniform course of legislation and executive action, instead of on the basis of
their separateness from the surrounding non-Indian population. Id. at 45-47.
102. 109 U.S. at 568-71.
103. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
104. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1976)).
105. 118 U.S. at 379.
106. 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
107. 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
108. 187 U.S. 294 (1902).'
109. As stated in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock: "[T]he United States practically as-
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The Court in Stephens noted the legal change in the tribe's status, but
stressed the partial superiority of the federal government over them
even at the time of the treaties. The Court held that at no time had the
United States ever "constitute[d] them a separate, independent, sover-
eign people, with no superior within its limits."" 0 The Court stated
that the tribe's peculiar relation to the United States was illustrated by
the fact that it had been capable of entering into treaties.' The tribe,
however, was also said to be "'subject to the power and authority of
the laws of the United States when Congress should choose, as it did
determine in the act of March 3, 1871.' "112 That treaties were made
indicates the special status that the tribes initially possessed, but the
existence of the 1871 act indicates that they were denied the right to the
continuation of that status.
Recent cases
After cases such as Stephens which established the full power of
Congress in Indian affairs, little was said about the place occupied by
the tribes in the federal system for many years. Among recent cases,
the issue was first raised in United States v. Mazurie.1l3 That case up-
held Congressional delegation of power to a tribe to regulate the sale of
alcoholic beverages on the reservation. The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist, stated that the delegation was not to a "private, vol-
untary organization" as the lower court had held, but to an entity with
"a certain degree of independent authority over matters that affect the
internal and social relations of tribal life," citing Worcester and
Kagama.14  The Court did not reach the question whether the tribe
had the power in itself, without a congressional delegation, to impose
the regulation in question, but did recognize that some attributes of
sovereignty are retained by the tribes.
The source of "independent authority" was not stated, except to
sumed the full control over the Cherokees as well as the other nations constituting the five
civilized tribes ....
The holding that Congress had power to provide a method for determining membership
in the five civilized tribes, and for ascertaining the citizenship thereof preliminary to a divi-
sion of the property of the tribe among its members, necessarily involved the further holding
that Congress was vested with authority to adopt measures to make the tribal property pro-
ductive, and secure therefrom an income for the benefit of the tribe." Id. at 306-07.
110. 174 U.S. at 485.
Ill. Id.
112. 174 U.S. at 486 (quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27 (1886)).
113. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
114. Id. at 557.
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the extent that reference was made to Worcester and Kagama.115 In
light of this reference, "independent authority" was presumably a term
used to describe the sovereignty that the tribes have been allowed to
retain since 1871. The authority may fairly be termed independent
because certain powers may be retained by the tribe even without spe-
cific enumeration, and various "attributes of sovereignty""16 may be
exercised without an express delegation of power of the type involved
in Mazurie. Although these powers are subject to congressional con-
trol or even congressional divestiture, they can be exercised without
specific congressional approval if they are within the penumbra of sov-
ereignty retained by treaty.'17 Thus a general treaty provision, such as
one guaranteeing an orderly government, may give a tribe certain pow-
ers over "the internal and social relations of tribal life.""l 8
In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,119 the Court
recognized that the tribes had started from a position of sovereignty,
independent of the federal system, and had been allowed to retain
some "attributes of sovereignty." 120 The past sovereignty of the tribes
was said to provide a "backdrop" for the interpretation of treaties and
statutes. 121 This notion, that because the tribes were dealt with by
treaty they must have been sovereign at the time, applied in cases as
early as Worcester v. Georgia. 22 As noted above, the concept was also
central to the Crow Dog case, decided approximately three decades af-
ter the practice of treating with the Indians ended. 123 In all three of
these cases, the fact that the treaty-making power had been invoked
was in itself relevant to the determination of the status of the tribes
under the treaties still in force.124
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832)).
117. But see notes 130-31, 135 & accompanying text infra.
118. 419 U.S. at 557.
119. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
120. Id. at 173 (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886)).
121. Id. at 172.
122. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832); see text accompanying note 71 supra.
123. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883); see text accompanying note 97
supra.
124. The historical counterpart of this legal development has been described as follows:
'Treating with the Indians for the extinguishment of land titles on the basis of colony deal-
ing with tribe, together with the diplomatic negotiations of war and peace, gave foundation
and strength to the doctrine that the Indian tribes were independent nations with their own
rights and sovereignty, rather than subjects of the colony or nation in whose territory they
resided. In spite of the fact that the independent-nation theory caused many complications,
it became so firmly established in practice that it could not easily be shaken off." F.
PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FoRMATIvE YEARS 142 (1962).
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In other recent cases brief references suggest that tribal powers
may be derived from inherent powers retained after entering the fed-
eral system or from a specific federal law. In Williams v. Lee, 25 the
Court stated that Congress "recognized" the tribes' governmental au-
thority in a treaty, 26 and in Fisher v. District Court,'27 the Court stated
that powers of self-government were "conferred" upon the tribe.' 28
In two 1978 cases, the Court made more expansive efforts to define
sovereignty in the context of tribal power. In Olihant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe,'29 the Court held that the tribe did not have the power to
prosecute non-Indians for criminal offenses committed on the reserva-
tion. The tribe claimed as the source of such power its "inherent sov-
ereignty."' 30  The decision acknowledged that there are powers
retained from original sovereignty, but held that some of these powers
may be lost even though not specifically divested by treaty or statute.
They were said to be lost because when the tribes were incorporated
into the federal system they necessarily gave up powers inconsistent
with their new status.' 3'
Shortly after Oihant, the Court handed down its decision in
United States v. Wheeler,'32 holding that the double-jeopardy clause
did not bar the prosecution of an Indian in federal court under the
Major Crimes Act133 after he had been convicted in tribal court of a
lesser included offense arising out of the same incident. The Court
held the separate-sovereigns doctrine applicable, and found that the
tribe's power to punish its members was not merely a form of federal
power. Rather, it derived from a completely different source-the
tribe's inherent sovereign power.' 34
The Court adopted the view that tribal powers not divested by
treaty or statute are retained, but with a qualification that renders the
rule much less significant than it might at first seem. This qualifica-
tion was the one that had been stated in Oliphant; powers may be lost
125. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
126. Id. at 223.
127. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
128. Id. at 387.
129. 98 S. Ct. 1011 (1978).
130. See note 2 & accompanying text supra.
131. 98 S. Ct. at 1021.
132. 98 S. Ct. 1079 (1978).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
134. 98 S. Ct. at 1086. An interesting case which illustrates the application of different
laws to tribal activity depending upon the source of the tribal power being exercised is Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 556 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1977), holding that a tribal elec-
tion authorized by federal regulations is governed by the twenty-sixth amendment.
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"by implication as a necessary result of [the tribes'] dependent
status." 13
5
Together, Olphant and Wheeler serve to clarify the nature of tri-
bal sovereignty as it relates to tribal power. Mazurie had recognized
and approved the delegation of federal power to the tribes, but it and
other cases going as far back as Worcester had been less clear about the
source of other tribal powers. 136  Oli0hant and Wheeler both acknowl-
edged the existence of inherent tribal powers retained from before the
subjugation to the federal government. The holding of Wheeler com-
plements that of Mazurie137 by adding recognition of retained sover-
eign power to Mazurie's recognition of federally delegated power.
Each opinion engaged in a study of the relevant laws to determine
whether there was a retention or a divestiture of the tribal power in
question, either by expression or by implication. 38
A problem remains, however, in the wake of Olphant and
Wheeler because of the Court's emphasis on the "inconsistent with
their status" test. As a standard for determining whether a particular
tribal power is divested or retained, this phrase fails to provide suffi-
cient direction or clarity. The "status" of Indian tribes will ultimately
depend upon what powers they have. In this sense, therefore, measur-
ing powers by looking at status is essentially a circular approach.
Measuring powers by examining the tribe's status is not unlike the
empirical approach which the Court has usually declined to employ in
the past. 139 The difference is that the empirical test discussed above
involved examining the status of a particular tribe, while the Oli0hant-
Wheeler test involves consideration of the status of the tribes in
general.
This difference in perspective highlights the fallacy of regarding
the language from O10hant and Wheeler as setting forth a new test for
tribal power: an individual tribe's situation may differ from that of
tribes in general because of a specific treaty or statute. Thus, the "in-
consistent with their status" language should not be mistaken for a new
test that replaces the examination of relevant treaties and statutes.140
135. 98 S. Ct. at 1086; Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 98 S. Ct. at 1021.
136. See text accompanying notes 114-18 & 125-28 supra; see also text accompanying
notes 68-71 supra.
137. See notes 113-14 & 132-34 & accompanying text supra.
138. United States v. Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1088-89 (1978); United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544, 553-56 (1975).
139. See text accompanying notes 76-84 & 102-03 supra.
140. This view is corroborated by the analysis of a host of relevant laws in each of the
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The tribal status language is, however, a valid and helpful charac-
terization if kept in perspective. Unlike earlier and more absolute for-
mulations, it acknowledges and deals with the fact that the status of the
tribes did change gradually as they came fully within the federal sys-
tem.141 Furthermore, the tribal status formulation highlights the im-
portance to a tribal power analysis of whether the power is to be
asserted over Indians or over non-Indians. 142
Thus, the emphasis on tribal status in Oliphant and Wheeler
should not be viewed as an all-encompassing, new test for determining
whether a specific tribal power exists. The determination of tribal
powers still must begin and end with a thorough analysis of treaties and
statutes. The "inconsistent with their status" terminology more closely
describes the results of the test for tribal powers than it defines the test
itself. But because the tribal status language brings into consideration
the realities of the historical federal-tribal relationship, and because
this relationship is pertinent to the interpretation of the relevant laws,
tribal status is best viewed as a part of the backdrop against which the
treaties and statutes should be interpreted. As we have seen, the Court
had earlier referred to the past sovereignty of the tribes as such a back-
drop. 143 In Oi6hant and Wheeler, it has reminded us, and perhaps
itself, that the original prefederal sovereignty of the tribes is only part
of the story. The full historical-legal picture also includes the tribes'
coming within the federal system and acquiring a new status.
Summary
A judicial view of tribal sovereignty emerges from the Cherokee Nation
cases to the present that is in harmony with the dictates of the Constitu-
tion and statutes so far as tribal power is concerned. Worcester indi-
cates that during the treaty period the tribes possessed some
independence from the federal system. This independence is the rea-
son they were dealt with by treaty, and the treaties recognized varying
degrees of sovereignty.
After 1871, the treaties were still in force unless abrogated by Con-
gress. Crow Dog shows that the former, sovereign status of the tribes
two opinions. See United States v. Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. at 1088-89; Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 98 S. Ct. at 1017-20.
141. See notes 7, 13-14 & accompanying text supra Ophant and Wheeler acknowl-
edge this development to a greater extent than any prior decisions. See Oliphant v. Su-
quamish Indian Tribe, 98 S. Ct. at 1020; United States v. Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. at 1086.
142. The lack of power over non-Indians in certain situations is, of course, the holding
of Ol0hant.
143. See note 121 & accompanying text supra.
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is a relevant factor in determining the rights allowed to be retained by
treaties. Crow Dog and Kagama, however, confirm that after 1871 the
tribes were subject to federal regulation and were not in a position of
sovereignty comparable to that of the states and the federal govern-
ment. 44  Cases after Crow Dog and Kagama illustrate the broad
power of the federal government to regulate Indian affairs. 45 The lat-
est cases which examine the source of tribal power, Olihant and
Wheeler, confirm the existence of retained sovereign power in the
tribes and underline the importance of examining the applicable trea-
ties and statutes in order to determine a tribe's status.
Tribal Sovereignty and State Jurisdiction
The Basis for Limiting State Jurisdiction
The foregoing analysis contains the rationale underlying the
proper relationship between the tribes and the states. The tribes pos-
sess powers of self-government that are: 1) inherent in their status and
not specifically divested by treaty or congressional action; 2) retained
as recognized by federal treaty; or 3) conferred by congressional enact-
ment. The recognition of tribal power is a matter of federal law. If
the exercise of tribal power, therefore, conflicts with the exercise of
state power, the latter must yield because it has been preempted by
federal authority.
Although there is no other equally sound rationale under which
tribal power could preclude state power, the case law in this area has
not been uniform in articulating the preemption analysis. Specifically,
much confusion has prevailed since Williams v. Lee as to whether the
limit of state jurisdiction is reached when it is preempted by federal law
or when it "infringes" upon tribal jurisdiction. A careful examination
of the relevant cases will show that from the seminal decision in
Worcester to the most recent cases, the preemption analysis has been
the only sound and consistent basis for decision, and that even
Williams and those cases not expressly employing the preemption ap-
proach are not inconsistent with it.
Worcester v. Georgia,14 6 discussed supra,14 7 was the first case that
squarely presented the question of whether tribal or state law applied
144. The particulars of the relationships between the federal government, the states and
the tribes in terms of the division of governmental power are discussed in Part II, infra.
145. The federal legislative power, and the possibilities for state legislative action, are
discussed in Part III, infra.
146. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
147. See notes 66-77 & accompanying text supra.
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to activity within Indian country. The issue was whether a non-Indian
was subject to Georgia laws that purported to regulate conduct within
the Cherokee Nation. The Supreme Court held that because treaties
had recognized the sovereignty of the Cherokees and had allowed the
tribe's exercise of sovereign powers to continue, the tribe was free to
exercise extensive self-governmental powers within its territory. These
treaties, along with subsequent legislation continuing the rights granted
by the treaties, preempted the exercise of state authority.148 The Court
viewed the scheme established by preemptive federal power as allowing
for complete self-government by the tribe of its members and territory,
except in areas in which the federal government itself interfered. 149
Thus, there was no room left for the exercise of state governmental
power. Although the Court described the politically distinct status of
the tribes in strong terms to justify its holding that they possessed ex-
tensive self-governmental power,1 50 the opinion made it clear that the
Cherokees' right of self-government could be exercised because it had
been recognized and allowed to continue in the relevant treaty: "This
treaty, thus explicitly recognizing the national character of the Cher-
okees, and their right of self-government. . . has been frequently re-
newed, and is now in full force."' 151 The Court did not hold that the
exercise of tribal power in itself prevented the exercise of state power.
It held that the exercise of state power was "repugnant to the constitu-
tion, laws and treaties of the United States."1 52
Worcester thus employed a preemption analysis. The fact that
the tribe was dealt with by treaty was a factor which influenced inter-
pretation of the treaties.1 53 If a treaty recognizing tribal self-govern-
ment was still in force, it preempted any state jurisdiction which was
inconsistent with the treaty right of self-government.1 5 4
After Worcester, the ability of the tribes to exercise whatever pow-
ers of self-government they may have had arising from treaties became
so impaired that no more cases presenting a direct clash between tribal
and state jurisdiction arose until relatively recent times. The first mod-
em case in which tribal and state entities competed for subject-matter
jurisdiction was Williams v. Lee, 55 a decision which failed to articulate
148. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556-58, 559, 561.
149. Id. at 553-54.
150. Id. at 559.
151. Id. at 556.
152. Id. at 561.
153. Id. at 559.
154. Id. at 561.
155. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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the preemption principle clearly and thereby led to considerable confu-
sion in the area. In Williams a non-Indian retailer holding a federal
trader's license operated a store on the Navajo Reservation. He
brought an action in state court against two Indian customers for the
cost of goods sold on credit. The Arizona Supreme Court applied the
preemption test narrowly and held that the state courts had jurisdiction
because no federal statute expressly barred such jurisdiction.156 The
United States Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Black empha-
sized the right of tribal self-government in order to hold that, because
self-government was a treaty right, all state jurisdiction which inter-
fered with that right was preempted. The emphasis on tribal self-gov-
ernment was viewed by some as a departure from the preemption
approach and as the elevation of the principle of tribal self-government
to the status of an independent bar to state jurisdiction. 157 No expla-
nation was given, however, either in Williams or comments on
Williams, of how the exercise of power by an Indian tribe could of its
own force prohibit a state from exercising jurisdiction over persons and
territory within its borders.
A careful reading of Williams reveals that it actually employed the
preemption test. First, the Court noted that in Worcester, Georgia
statutes passed "despite federal treaties" were held invalid because
state jurisdiction over Indian affairs was preempted by federal author-
ity. 158 The Court acknowledged, however, that Worcester did not ad-
dress state jurisdiction over cases "where essential tribal relations were
not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopard-
ized,"' 159 or where Congress had conferred jurisdiction upon the
states. 160 The Court then specifically examined the treaty rights of the
Navajos:
Implicit in these treaty terms, as it was in the treaties with the Cher-
okees involved in Worcester v. Georgia, was the understanding that
the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the
jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed....
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdic-
tion here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over
Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indi-
156. 83 Ariz. 241, 244, 319 P.2d 998, 1000 (1958).
157. Comment, The Indian Battlefor Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. Rav. 445, 472-75,
478 (1970). " Williams for the first time recognized an independent Indian interest in self-
government which stood as a barrier to state involvement in Indian affairs." Id. at 478.
158. 358 U.S. at 218-19.
159. Id. at 219-20.
160. Id. at 220-21.
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ans to govern themselves. . . . Congress recognized this authority in
the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since. If this
power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it.161
State jurisdiction was barred, not by any inherent right of tribal self-
government, but by federal preemption, because federal law recognized
the tribal right. The emphasis upon broad tribal powers was appropri-
ate to show that the attempted exercise of state jurisdiction conflicted
with the scope of the preempting treaty and that the result of the case
was in line with the historical and factual considerations present.
The implications of a Williams test were not lost on states seeking
to exercise jurisdiction over Indian affairs. If state jurisdiction may be
exercised wherever such jurisdiction does not infringe upon tribal
rights, then a state arguably may exercise its power in any area in
which the tribal government has not specifically acted, or in which the
tribe has of its own accord ceded jurisdiction to the state, regardless of
whether federal authorization would permit it to do so. On the other
hand, if federal power is the preemptive force, state action may be pre-
cluded even in matters on which the tribal government has not spoken,
on the theory that state jurisdiction would be inconsistent with a fed-
eral policy fostering Indian self-government. State courts succeeded in
applying the test to allow state jurisdiction in many instances, 162 and a
great deal of confusion arose as to whether such a test existed, and if so,
in what circumstances it might be applied.
In AXennerly v. District Court,163 the State of Montana relied on the
notion that the infringement or noninfringement of sovereignty is an
independent denial or grant of jurisdiction to the states. The state ar-
gued that it was free to exercise jurisdiction because there was no in-
fringement of tribal sovereignty under the facts of that case; there was
no infringement of sovereignty because the Blackfeet tribe had ap-
proved the concurrent exercise of state jurisdiction. Exercise of state
jurisdiction was therefore consistent with the exercise of tribal self-gov-
ernment: the Williams test was satisfied.
The Supreme Court employed the preemption analysis to deny
state jurisdiction,164 though it did not specifically examine the preempt-
161. Id. at 221-23. This portion of Williams, containing the reference to the treaty
terms, was quoted by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in United States v. Wheeler,
98 S. Ct. 1079, 1086 (1978).
162. See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72-76 (1962).
163. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
164. The Court has consistently applied the preemption test to measure the extent of
state jurisdiction. In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), the Court held
state jurisdiction applicable to Indian fishing where such jurisdiction did not constitute a
prohibited infringement.
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ing treaties or statutes. Presumably the Court relied on Williams for
the principle that the subject matter was within the scope of self-gov-
ernment and that federal law conferred a tribal right of self-govern-
ment on the tribe in question.165 The Court, therefore, proceeded to
inquire whether there was a specific federal authorization for state ju-
risdiction over matters involving tribal members which arose on the
reservation. The Court considered Public Law 280166 as a possible au-
thorization, but held that it did not apply because there had been no
affirmative legislative action by the state.167
In 1973 the Court attempted to clarify the preemption standard in
two cases involving state taxation. In McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission a state income tax applied to a reservation Indian was
invalidated on the ground that it "interfered with matters which the
relevant treaty and statutes leave to the exclusive province of the Fed-
eral Government and the Indians themselves."' 68 The Court under-
took a thorough review of the 1868 treaty with the Navajos, the act of
Congress admitting Arizona to the union, and other statutes. 169 The
opinion expressly noted that "the trend has been away from the idea of
inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward
reliance on federal pre-emption."170 In an accompanying footnote, the
Court added that "the source of federal authority over Indian matters
has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now generally recog-
nized that the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating
commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making."'' This reference
indicates the Court now considers that the exercise of federal legislative
power, rather than any inherent tribal right or power, limits state juris-
diction. The Court further stated that "in almost all cases federal trea-
165. This indicates that Williams is to be read as applying broadly to Indian tribes,
putting the burden on a party opposing tribal jurisdiction to show that a particular tribe did
not receive guarantees similar to those found in the treaty in Williams. See the discussion
of Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), at text accompa-
nying note 182 infra.
166. See note 43 supra.
167. Indeed, the State of Montana had never purported to assume Public Law 280 juris-
diction and made no argument that it had such jurisdiction. The tribe had adopted a reso-
lution granting concurrent civil jurisdiction to the state prior to passage of Public Law 280.
The Supreme Court held such grant invalid in that no federal mechanism by which such a
transfer could have been effected was in existence prior to Public Law 280, and the require-
ments of that statute and subsequent legislation were not met by the prior grant. 400 U.S. at
427-29.
168. 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
169. Id. at 173-78.
170. Id. at 172.
171. Id. at 172 n.7.
[Vol. 30
INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
ties and statutes define the boundaries of federal and state
jurisdiction."1 72 This statement leaves open the possibility that there
may, in a rare case, be some federal preemption merely from the fact
that a tribe exists, though there are no specific treaties or statutes to
define the rights of the tribe. The likelihood of such a case is so remote
that the theoretical questions of residual sovereignty and preemption in
the absence of specific laws are largely moot.1 73
The decision then came close to expressly extinguishing the in-
fringement of tribal sovereignty as an independent bar to state jurisdic-
tion by saying that the sovereignty doctrine "is relevant, then, not
because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but
because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties
and federal statutes must be read."' 74 Williams was not, however, in-
terpreted as a preemption case in McClanahan. Instead, there was
said to be a "Williams test," but it was held applicable principally
where non-Indians were involved. 175
In McClanahan, as in Kennerly, the state argued that the Williams
test could be used in its favor: where there is no infringement there is
no bar to state jurisdiction. 76 McClanahan rejected the argument
again, but did not put it permanently to rest because' the opinion failed
to state that there is no "Williams test" in the sense of a grant or denial
of state jurisdiction independent of preemption considerations.
In the companion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,177 the
Court phrased the question as whether "paramount federal law permits
these taxes to be levied."1 78 The "conceptual clarity" of Worcester
was found to have "given way to more individualized treatment of par-
ticular treaties and specific federal statutes."'' 79 The Court reviewed
the act admitting New Mexico as a state and the 1934 Indian Reorgani-
zation Act, and found that the statutes did not preclude state taxation
of the gross receipts of an off-reservation ski resort operated by the
tribe. 80
172. Id. at 172 n.8.
173. Id.
174. 411 U.S. 172; see text accompanying notes 122-24 supra.
175. Id. at 179.
176. In McClanahan, the state claimed that taxing individual Indians could not be con-
sidered an infringement of tribal sovereignty. Id. at 179. As in Kennerly, the asserted non-
infringement was itself questionable, even if non-infringement were to be considered a grant
of state jurisdiction. Id. at 177-79.
177. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
178. Id. at 146.
179. Id. at 148.
180. A statement of the Williams holding was employed as an affirmation of the ability
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The question of limits on state jurisdiction was next raised in an-
other tax case, Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,18' an
action brought by the confederation and some of its members challeng-
ing cigarette sales taxes, personal property taxes and the state's vendor
licensing statute as applied to reservation Indians. The Supreme Court
considered McClanahan to be controlling, 182 and invalidated the taxes
on the ground that they violated the supremacy clause, "not any auto-
matic exemptions 'as a matter of constitutional law.' ",183
With respect to the sales tax as applied to non-Indian purchasers
of goods sold by reservation Indian merchants, the Court held that an
Indian retailer could be required to collect and remit the tax. The tax
was on the purchaser, and therefore a tax on non-Indians rather than
Indians. For this reason, state taxation was not preempted as in
McClanahan or as to the Indian purchasers in Moe. The requirement
that an Indian retailer collect and remit the tax was called a "minimal
burden,"' 84 and was tangentially determined not to interfere with the
tribal self-government ruling of Williams.185 The case clearly applied
a preemption analysis, and, therefore, this brief reference to Williams
should not be regarded as a resurrection of a noninfringement test.
That the Court had no intention of using an infringement ration-
ale is clear not only from the brevity of the reference to Williams but
also from the fact that such reasoning would amount to a grant of state
jurisdiction based on a finding of no infringement, in effect overruling
Kennerly and McClanahan186 which had expressly rejected the argu-
ment that the only limit on state jurisdiction was noninfringement of
tribal self-government.
While the legacy of an independent "Williams test" was scarcely
noticed in Moe, it caused more confusion in the most recent major case
of the State to exercise jurisdiction when federal authority was found not to have preempted
the area. Id. at 148.
181. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). Between Mescalero and Moe, the Court decided Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975), in which the jurisdiction of the state to enforce its hunting
laws against Indians in an area which a tribe had ceded to the United States was at issue.
Antoine argued that the terms of the cession agreement exempted Indians from the opera-
tion of state law, and that its ratification invoked the supremacy clause. The Court held in
his favor, relying entirely upon preemption as the ground for prohibiting state jurisdiction.
182. The state did not dispute that the treaty and statutes relied upon by the tribe were
"'essentially the same as those involved in McClanahan.' "425 U.S. at 477. The Court thus
found no need to retrace the analysis of the treaty and statutes that had appeared in
McClanahan.
183. Id. at 481 n.17.
184. Id. at 483.
185. Id.
186. See notes 135, 147, & accompanying text supra.
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on state jurisdiction, Fisher v. District Court.18 7 Fisher presented the
question of whether an Indian could invoke the jurisdiction of state
courts to adopt an Indian minor. In its civil jurisdiction aspect, the
case was similar to Williams. Because the parties in Fisher were all
Indians and the subject of the action was adoption of a minor and
hence an area of considerable tribal interest, the infringement consider-
ations were even stronger than in Williams. It is understandable, then,
that the per curiam opinion first mentioned Williams, noting that at
least the Williams standard would have to be met in order for the state
to exercise jurisdiction. s8 Immediately after its reference to Williams,
however, the Court went on to find that the tribal right of self-govern-
ment was "protected by federal statute,"' 89 that it had been "conferred
upon the Northern Cheyenne Tribe"'90 and that "[n]o federal statute
sanctions this interference with tribal self-government."'19 Finally, the
Court addressed the contention that tribal sovereignty in itself cannot
preempt state law or divest state courts of jurisdiction. 9 2 The Court
noted that the tribe's authority came by virtue of the 1934 Indian Reor-
ganization Act and held:
Consequently, it implements an overriding federal policy which is
clearly adequate to defeat state jurisdiction over litigation involving
reservation Indians. Accordingly, even if we assume that the Mon-
tana courts properly exercised adoption jurisdiction prior to the or-
ganization of the Tribe, a question we do not decide, that jurisdiction
has now been pre-empted.' 93
Thus Fisher clarified that Williams had obscured. Infringement of tri-
bal self-government, or sovereignty, will preclude state jurisdiction if,
and because, preempting federal statutes confer the power of self-gov-
ernment upon the tribe. If state law infringes upon tribal self-govern-
ment, the state law is invalid under the supremacy clause.
State infringement of tribal self-government is not a legal doctrine
which of its own force can prohibit state jurisdiction, but if there is
187. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
188. Id. at 386.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 387.
191. Id. at 388.
192. Id. at 390.
193. Id. Some lower court decisions rely heavily on the fact that a tribe is actually exer-
cising a particular right in order to find that state jurisdiction is preempted. Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. State of New Mexico, 77395 (Dist. of N.M. Aug. 2, 1978); State of Arizona
ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle 413 F.2d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 1969). The quoted portion of Fischer
indicates that the court has left open the question of whether there is federal preemption
even without any exercise of power by a tribe. However, the court found preemption of
state taxes in McClanahan and Moe even though there were no competing tribal taxes.
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infringement of a federally protected right of tribal self-government,
this fact will indicate that the state activity involved must cease because
it is preempted by federal law. It is because tribal self-government is a
federally secured right that a state may not infringe upon it; not be-
cause tribal power displaces state power.
The Extent of Preemption
It is sometimes asserted that the federal government has entirely
preempted the field of Indian affairs.'9 4 Arguably, this doctrine re-
sulted from the "conceptual clarity" of the Worcester opinion which
stated broadly that the Cherokees were a people upon whom the state's
laws could have no effect.' 95 Subsequent to Worcester, "total preemp-
tion" has "given way to more individualized treatment." 96 For in-
stance, in Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Department,197 the
Supreme Court noted that the tribe based its claim that the state could
not regulate on-reservation fishing by Indians upon "federal preemp-
tion of on-reservation Indian affairs,' 198 and then significantly cited a
portion of Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, which states that general-
izations on the subject are difficult and that state law may be applied
unless there is an infringement of self-government or impairment of "a
right granted or reserved by federal law." 199
In many cases the question of whether state law applies unless ex-
pressly preempted or does not apply unless expressly authorized is aca-
demic. Most state action which asserts governmental authority is
likely to be preempted because Congress will normally have "granted
or reserved" considerable governmental authority to the tribe. If state
194. An instructive recent view is that expressed in Lynaugh, Developing Theories of
State Jurisdiction over Indians: The Dominance ofthe Preemption Analysis, 38 MONT. L. REv.
63, 75 (1977): "While the concept of federal preemption is applied in a restricted fashion in
other areas of federal supremacy, such as in regulation of interstate commerce, federal pre-
emption is given broader meaning in the context of federal Indian policy.
' * .[Slince the traditional principle has been that States are without jurisdiction over
Indian reservations unless expressly authorized, the Court is searching for a grant of state
jurisdiction rather than a divestment of state jurisdiction."
This expression is circular in the sense that it states that there is broad preemption
because there is total preemption, which is the case if a "grant of state jurisdiction" is
needed. However, it is correct in the sense that past confusion about the possibility of total
federal preemption of Indian affairs is a partial cause of the present view that most aspects
of on-reservation Indian activity are preempted. See text accompanying notes 196-98 infra.
195. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
196. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
197. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
198. Id. at 174 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1973)).
199. 411 U.S. at 148.
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jurisdiction infringes upon this authority, it is preempted. However,
the question becomes important in cases where the treaties and federal
statutes are relatively silent, givng little guidance either by expression
or by inference.
It should be noted that the broad Williams sovereignty or nonin-
fringement test is inconsistent with the idea that there is total federal
preemption of Indian affairs. If the states are preempted except as
they are given express authorization to act, considerations of nonin-
fringement are superfluous. Indeed, state claims that noninfringement
could work in reverse to authorize state jurisdiction were rejected in
McClanahan2°° and Kennerly v. District Court.20 1 The Williams test
has meaning only if states are free to exercise jurisdiction unless pre-
empted. Then infringement or sovereignty might be viewed as a sec-
ond bar, coequal with preemption, or as a factor indicating when
preemption has occurred.
The converse of total federal preemption may be called specific
preemption. Under total preemption, there is no state jurisdiction over
reservation activities unless an exception to the total preemption is spe-
cifically created by Congress. Under specific preemption, there is gen-
erally state jurisdiction except where it is preempted. As was noted
above, Worcester has been cited as holding that the entire field of In-
dian affairs has been preempted by the federal government. Williams
clearly implied the converse, that state jurisdiction applies unless pre-
empted or barred by tribal sovereignty. In Organized Village of Kake
v. Egan202 the Court found that the Worcester rule had given way to
specific preemption.2° 3 In Mescalero, the Court expressly rejected to-
tal preemption: "At the outset, we reject-as did the state court-the
broad assertion that the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction
over the Tribe for all purposes and that the State is therefore prohibited
from enforcing its revenue laws against any tribal enterprise .... ,,204
Each assertion of state jurisdiction requires an examination of
whether the federal government has preempted the subject. For exam-
ple, Williams found that state civil jurisdiction over Indians for matters
arising within the reservation was barred.205 The same type of fact
200. 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973).
201. 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971).
202. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
203. Id. at 72-75.
204. 411 U.S. at 147.
205. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1958).
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situation was presented in Kennerly v. District Court,20 6 but it was un-
clear from Williams whether states were prohibited from exercising ju-
risdiction by a preempting federal law or by tribal sovereignty itself.
20 7
The Court treated the subject of civil jurisdiction as having been pre-
empted, presumably on the basis of the Williams holding, and conse-
quently looked to see if there was a specific authorization for state
jurisdiction.20 8 This analysis does not mean that the entire field of In-
dian affairs has been preempted. Express authority is not needed for
every exercise of state jurisdiction, but it is needed for state civil juris-
diction over reservation Indians because Congress has preempted that
area.
Cases which analyze the impact of state taxation on reservation
Indians illustrate the specific preemption approach. Warren Trading
Post v. Arizona State Tax Commission20 9 held that Congress had pre-
empted the taxation of licensed traders on the reservation.
McClanahan held that Congress had preempted the taxation of reser-
vation Indians.210 Accordingly, Mescalero held that while in general
there is no total preemption of Indian affairs and state law applies un-
less prohibited, "in the special area of state taxation" of reservation
Indians the converse was true. Because of federal preemption, express
authorization for the application of state tax law to reservation Indians
is needed.21' Thus, in Bryan v. Itasca County,212 where state taxation
was again the question, the Court found it imperative to determine
whether there was an express authorization for state jurisdiction. 21 3
In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,214 the Court
again started from the McClanahan holding that state taxation of reser-
vation Indians is preempted. It rejected the argument that the United
States had preempted state taxation as to the Navajos in McClanahan
but not as to the confederation in Moe.215 Next it rejected the argu-
ment that there was an express authorization of state jurisdiction,
206. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
207. See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 480-81 & n.17;
text accompanying note 183 supra.
208. See notes 163-67 & accompanying text supra.
209. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
210. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
211. 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
212. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
213. Id. at 377.
214. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
215. Id. at 476. This argument was premised upon the assertion that the Indians in
Moe were integrated into the surrounding community. See also text accompanying note 81
supra.
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which is required if the specific field is preempted.21 6 Finally the
Court held that an Indian retailer can be required to collect a state sales
tax from non-Indian customers on the reservation and remit it to the
state.217 Express authority was not needed for this exercise of state
jurisdiction because the subject was not preempted. The state action
was not a matter of taxing reservation Indians, which had been held
preempted in McClanahan.218 Nor was it taxation of a federally li-
censed retailer, held to be preempted in Warren Trading Post.219 It
was a state administrative regulation, which is enforceable unless pre-
empted, because there is no total preemption of Indian affairs. The
Court reiterated the Mescalero rejection of the total-preemption
concept. 220
Although these recent cases present a patchwork of what areas
have and have not been preempted, a close examination of these cases
shows a basic consistency in the Court's mode of analysis. Congress
has not totally preempted the field of Indian affairs, so state jurisdic-
tion may be exercised unless it infringes on an area specifically pre-
empted by federal law or a superseding regulatory scheme. In areas
found to be preempted, a state must show a specific federal grant of
jurisdiction.
Tribal Sovereignty and Equal Protection
Sovereignty and Federal Legislation
Introduction
As demonstrated above, tribal sovereignty, as it relates to limiting
state jurisdiction, is not a constitutional principle that operates by itself
to divest states of jurisdiction normally exercised, but it is a factor
which may warrant a finding that a particular exercise of state power is
preempted by federal supremacy. In the context of equal protection
challenges to federal Indian legislation, the cases are ambiguous as to
whether sovereignty is regarded as a preeminent principle, or merely as
a legal fact. In either case, a finding of sovereignty invariably defeats
a challenge based upon equal protection arguments. Although it may
initially seem anomalous that tribal sovereignty immunizes federal In-
216. 425 U.S. at 477-78. The asserted authorization was § 6 of the General Allotment
Act. See note 24 supra.
217. 425 U.S. at 481-83.
218. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
219. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
220. 425 U.S. at 483. See note 204 & accompanying text supra.
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dian legislation from equal protection challenges, the anomaly is re-
moved when the historical context is understood.
Kagama-The early formulation
United States v. Kagama22 presented an early challenge to a stat-
ute which classified Indians separately from non-Indians. In Exparte
Crow Dog,222 decided three years before Kagama, the Supreme Court
had held that the Sioux Tribe retained the power to punish one of its
own members for a crime committed against another member. Be-
cause a murder went unpunished as a result, Congress passed the Ma-
jor Crimes Act,2 23 which extended federal jurisdiction to serious
offenses between Indians. This legislation was challenged in Kagama.
The Court upheld the Act on the ground that Indians were depen-
dent upon the federal government for protection, and were, therefore,
subject to federal power. The Court addressed what was, in essence,
an equal protection claim, though it was cast in terms of a challenge to
congressional power. It noted that if the defendant had been a non-
Indian he would have been tried in state court, and stated: "The dis-
tinction is claimed to be that the offense under the statute is committed
by an Indian .... -224 The Court held that Congress could make this
distinction because of the dependent condition of the Indians "so
largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with
them, and the treaties in which. . . [the congressional duty of protec-
tion] has been promised. ' 225 Thus the practice of distinguishing be-
tween Indians and non-Indians in federal legislation was sanctioned by
the Court, on the basis of the tribes' unique relationship to the federal
government.
Mancari-The modern formulation
The first modem challenge to an Indian/non-Indian legislative
classification came in Morton v. Mancari2z6 in 1974. The issue was
whether a provision of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act2 27 creating
a preference for qualified Indians in Bureau of Indian Affairs employ-
ment constituted an invidious racial classification in violation of the
221. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
222. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
223. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, cl. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1976)).
224. 118 U.S. at 383.
225. Id. at 384.
226. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
227. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1976).
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fifth amendment. To resolve the issue, the Court immediately turned
to consideration of the "unique legal status of Indian tribes under fed-
eral law and. . the plenary power of Congress." 228 This power was
again said to emanate from the commerce clause and the treaty
power.229 The Court then noted that the exercise of this plenary power
had been so frequent as to result in an entire Title of the United States
Code, all of which it considered to be subject to the same challenge as
the statute in question.230
The employment preference was held not to be racially discrimi-
natory because it "is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group,
but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives
and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion. ' 231 Thus
the preference was "reasonably and directly related to a legitimate,
nonracially based goal."232 The standard for Indian legislation was a
requirement that it be "reasonable and rationally designed to further
Indian self-government." 233
Antelope-The Kagana situation revisited
The most compelling expression to date of the sovereignty concept
as an insulator against equal protection arguments is United States v.
Antelope.23 4 As in Kagama, the statute in question was the Major
Crimes Act.235 The equal protection question was squarely raised be-
cause, although the crime was committed on an Indian reservation, the
victim was a non-Indian. This meant that had the defendants been
non-Indians, they would have been tried in state court.236 They ar-
gued, therefore, that they were being tried in federal court and sub-
jected to the felony-murder rule solely because of their race.237 In
Kagama, the defendant had focused his challenge on the power of
Congress to classify Indians and treat them differently from non-Indi-
ans. With the development of the equal protection concept and its in-
corporation into the fifth amendment, the Indian defendant in
Antelope did not challenge the congressional power, but challenged the
228. 417 U.S. at 551.
229. Id. at 551-52; see also note 11 supra.
230. Id. at 552.
231. Id. at 554.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 555.
234. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
235. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976).
236. 430 U.S. at 644, n.4.
237. Id. at 644.
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congressional classification made by the legislation. The Court justi-
fied this classification the same way it had justified the "distinction" in
Kagama - on the basis of the special status of Indian tribes. The
Court stated that
the principles reaffirmed in Mancari and Fisher point more broadly
to the conclusion that federal regulation of Indian affairs is not based
upon impermissible classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted
in the unique status of Indians as "a separate people" with their own
political institutions. Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore,
is governance of once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be
viewed as legislation of a "'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'
"238
This statement suggests that federal legislation making the In-
dian/non-Indian legislative distinction is completely immune from any
claim that it is racially discriminatory. Because a claim of discrimina-
tion based entirely on constitutional grounds requires proof of the in-
tent to discriminate, 239 the statement that federal Indian legislation is
not motivated by racial considerations but by the special political status
of the tribes will operate to preclude virtually all equal protection chal-
lenges to federal Indian legislation made on the basis of race
discrimination.
Legislation that has an extremely disproportionate racial impact
may support an inference of racially discriminatory purpose.240  In
that case, the special political status of the tribes may lead to a determi-
nation that the classification is not purely racial, and that the inference
may therefore not be drawn. When the federal legislation expressly
names tribal members or reservation Indians, rather than all Indians, it
may be determined not to be a racial classification. The hiring prefer-
ence in Mancari, for example, was characterized as "political rather
than racial in nature" because it applied only to tribal members. 241 In
both Mancari and Antelope, the Court noted that Indians who were
not tribal members or not acting in Indian country were classified with
non-Indians; therefore, the classifications was not purely racial.242
238. Id. at 646 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974)).
239. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
240. Id. at 242-44.
241. 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974).
242. Id.; United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646-47 & n.7 (1977). This rationale is
very similar to that of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), decided the same day as
Mancari, in which the Court held that exempting pregnancy from disability insurance cov-
erage was not sex discrimination because it created classes consisting of pregnant persons
and non-pregnant persons. Id. at 496 & n.20. Aiello has been frequently criticized for this
approach by the commentators, one of whom noted the similarity to Mancari. Comment,
Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532, 1556 (1974).
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Even if the legislation is determined to discriminate racially, a
finding of disproportionate impact, a finding easily made in the case of
federal Indian legislation, may not be held to imply a purposeful dis-
crimination. In Mancari, the finding of disparate impact was out-
weighed by the act's political purpose, which was said to relate to the
"constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. ' 243 In
Antelope, the Court noted that the criminal statute in question was not
directly related to tribal self-government, but simply to regulation of
conduct "implicating Indian interests."' 244 The Court held, neverthe-
less, that the statute was "governance of once-sovereign political com-
munities," rather than legislation on the basis of race. 245
Sovereignty and State Legislation
The possibility of state action
It is not clear at this point whether the Mancari and Antelope
rationale 246 applies with equal force when the Indian/non-Indian dis-
tinction results from state action rather than federal action. If a state
classification between Indians and others need only be supported by a
rational basis, the states will have great latitude in Indian matters.
States may wish to respond to the Indian immunities from state taxa-
tion and jurisdiction247 by delivering corresponding state services only
to off-reservation Indians and other citizens who do not share the spe-
cial status of reservation Indians.248 The States' position would find
support in the converse rationale of Warren Trading Post in which the
Supreme Court held that because the state was relieved of the burden
of providing services to Indians it should not be able to tax the pro-
ceeds of a federally licensed Indian trader. 249 Actually, states often
provide numerous services to Indians, which they might be expected to
seek to avoid because of their inability to secure revenues in the normal
manner from reservation activities.
In addition to lost revenue, the jurisdictional status of reservation
Indians may be a catalyst for special treatment of reservation Indians
243. 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974).
244. 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977).
245. Id.
246. See text accompanying notes 226-45 supra.
247. See text accompanying notes 163-81 supra.
248. The precise line drawn for most federal legislative purposes is that Indians in "In-
dian country" are treated specially. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427
& n.2 (1975).
249. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691-92 (1965).
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by states. For instance, following Fisher v. District Court250 a state
might wish to formalize a "hands-off' policy toward reservation Indi-
ans on the part of certain of its social-welfare agencies, because the
state courts are not available for the final stage of child-welfare pro-
ceedings. Likewise, a state may not wish to give full faith and credit to
tribal court orders.25' In such cases, the state would be taking legisla-
tive or administrative action that classifies reservation Indians sepa-
rately from other persons. Often, such action has the effect of
disadvantaging reservation Indians, just as the Court's holding in
Fisher, meant to further the goal of tribal sovereignty, obviously disad-
vantaged the Indian plaintiffs therein.
That reservation Indians might be disadvantaged as the result of
limitation of state jurisdiction was acknowledged in Antelope, which
held that the rationale of Mancari applied to the denial, as well as the
conferral, of a privilege or benefit.252 The question which must be
considered is whether the sovereignty rationale of Mancari and
Antelope that upholds a federal law with this result will also sanction
state action of a similar nature. The limits of permissible state action
will be examined.
Restrictions on State Action-Preemption
The threshold issue in examining any state action in the area of
Indian affairs is federal preemption. As demonstrated by the analysis
of the state-jurisdiction cases su'ra,253 neither tribal sovereignty nor
federal preemption completely excludes state and local governmental
activity. Instead, state jurisdiction may be exercised except where it is
in conflict with federal law. Because federal treaties and laws are read
against the backdrop of the original sovereign status of the tribes,254
they are often found to include implicitly a broad grant of tribal self-
government.255 This reading of the treaties and statutes is inconsistent
250. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
251. Compare Jim v. CIT Financial Servs. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975) with
Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1977) (discussed in text accompanying notes 298-
300 infra).
252. 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1976). It should also be noted that there exists a separate but
related group of cases in which a benefit or service is held to be properly denied because the
state cannot confer the benefit without exercising jurisdiction it is not allowed to exercise
because of the preemption considerations discussed in Part II, supra. See White v.
Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977); Wauneka v. Campbell, 22 Ariz. App. 287, 526
P.2d 1085 (1974); Iron Bear v. District Court, 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292 (1974).
253. See text accompanying notes 146-93 supra.
254. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
255. See text accompanying notes 22 & 159-61 supra.
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with a finding that they also contain a right of access to state agencies,
facilities and courts. Both Congress 256 and the Supreme Court257 rec-
ognize that there is a mutually dependent relationship between the ben-
efits and burdens of state law. Thus, state legislation that is consistent
with specific exemptions from state jurisdiction accorded by federal
law, or that is in harmony with the notion of broad tribal powers of
self-government, should normally be held consistent with, rather than
preempted by, federal law.
Restrictions on state action--fourteenth amendment
The sovereignty rationale of Mancari and Antelope which denies
that the federal regulation of Indian affairs is based on impermissible
classifications258 under the fifth amendment is equally forceful when
applied against equal-protection challenges to state legislation under
the fourteenth amendment. If the principles that immunize federal
legislation are applied to state action, it may be concluded that legisla-
tion which makes a purely racial classification with no nexus to tribal
interests will be judged under the compelling-interest standard applied
to invidious classifications. On the other hand, legislation that classi-
fies according to tribal membership and reservation residence, when
these criteria are relevant to the status of an individual with respect to
the subject matter of the legislation, will only need to meet a rational-
basis test, assuming that the legislation does not deny a fundamental
right.
Restrictions on state action-pretextual discrimination
If state legislation, although ostensibly based upon the special
"quasi-sovereign" status of Indian tribes, is actually a pretext for dis-
crimination on the basis of race, it must be struck down under the four-
teenth amendment.259 Before Indian persons became citizens2 60
eligible to participate in state and local government, the non-Indians
256. See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (current version
at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1976)), which provided that allottees would "have the benefit of an be
subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may
reside."
257. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona
Tax Comnim'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965).
258. See notes 238-45 & accompanying text supra.
259. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
260. Many Indians who had received allotments under the General Allotment Act of
1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, became citizens by virtue of a provision in § 6 of that act. In
1924, Congress accorded citizenship to all Indians. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976)).
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surrounding them were termed "their deadliest enemies" 261 by the
Supreme Court. Real and perceived hostilities on both sides have con-
tinued, and the courts today are likely to be justifiably alert to the pos-
sibility of a discriminatory motive in legislative or administrative
action by state and local government concerning Indians.
However, the courts are reluctant to undertake this mode of in-
quiry unless a clear pattern of discriminatory intent can be dis-
cerned.262 Where state action responds narrowly and directly to
specific situations and problems that result from the special status of
reservation Indians and tribes, it is not likely to be considered unconsti-
tutionally motivated, even though its enactment may not be entirely
free of improper purpose on the part of some participants.263
Restrictions on state action-(lack of state power)
The due-process guarantee of the fifth amendment will have the
"same significance" as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
when a federal law applies to a limited territory and there is no na-
tional interest involved. 264 Where there is nationwide application and
a special, national interest, however, the two standards may not be
identical. In that event, the possibility is raised that a special, national
interest may validate federal Indian legislation, while similar legisla-
tion at the state level is constitutionally unacceptable.
The area most closely analogous to Indian affairs in this respect is
that of laws pertaining to aliens. For instance, a rule declaring aliens
ineligible for public employment has been struck down at the state
level,265 but would probably be upheld at the federal level if enacted
pursuant to proper procedures.266 The difference in treatment results
because the federal government has broad power and a peculiar, vital
interest-in the regulation of aliens, while the states have no particular
interest and only that power which the federal government authorizes
them to exercise.267
261. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
262. In Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), the majority refused
to consider evidence of a discriminatory motive, even where the concurrence found such a
motive and where a predecessor statute had been expressly discriminatory on its face. Id.
at 418, 422 (Murphy, J.).
263. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
264. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
265. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). But see Foley v. Connelie, 98 S. Ct.
1067 (1978) (New York statute barring aliens from the state police force upheld).
266. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976).
267. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976).
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At the federal level, the subject of Indian affairs occupies a posi-
tion similar to that of alien affairs. In both areas, federal activity is
likely to be a "routine and normally legitimate part of [the federal gov-
ernment's] business. ' 268 In both areas, the federal government has
broad, plenary power, such that an act of Congress is subject to mini-
mal judicial review because of the federal interest involved. 269
The considerations present at the national level in the area of alien
affairs, however, present a somewhat greater federal interest than in
Indian affairs. Involved in the former are "the conduct of foreign rela-
tions, the war power and the maintenance of a republican form of gov-
ernment." 270  The significance of these factors is that they were
pertinent considerations in the field of Indian affairs in the past but
have ceased to be relevant to that subject. When the tribes were formi-
dable external forces, the federal government's dealings with them were
governed by considerations of national security, the war and treaty
powers, the government of the territories and the management of vast
amounts of land that the government was held to control.271 As the
tribes were subjugated and brought completely within the federal sys-
tem, these important national considerations disappeared.2 72 How-
ever, Indian affairs continued to be directed and managed at the
federal level because the important national concerns present in the
early years left as a legacy a "unique legal status of Indian tribes under
federal law and. . . the plenary power of Congress, based on a history
of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status."273 Thus
the special, national interest in Indian affairs is not necessarily a con-
tinuing one, as it is in alien affairs. Rather, Indian affairs is a national
interest that exists mostly as a vestige of the past.274
268. Id.
269. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); Morton v. Man-
car, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 118 (1976) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
270. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), quoted in Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976).
271. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
272. See notes 7-144 & accompanying text supra.
273. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
274. Only the regulation of commerce with Indian tribes is committed to the federal
government by the Constitution; there is no constitutional guarantee that tribes will continue
to exist. See text accompanying notes 42.46 supra. Other Indian matters are of federal
interest only so long as Congress voluntarily continues its guardian-ward relationship with
Indian people and its sanctioning of the quasi-sovereign status of Indian tribes. Thus the
federal interest in Indian affairs is, for the most part, simply the result of federal preemption,
and, arguably, should not inhibit otherwise valid state legislation unless such legislation is
preempted.
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At the state level, there is even less similarity in the positions of
Indian and alien affairs. Federal regulation of immigration and citi-
zenship requires little response on the part of the states, and leaves the
states with virtually no need to specifically legislate regarding aliens.275
Indeed, the federal government's conferral of citizenship upon Indians
has not, of itself, generated controversy or caused problems for the
states. As is illustrated by the variety and number of state jurisdiction
cases, 27 6 federal regulation of Indian affairs has a much broader impact
upon state concerns than does federal regulation of aliens. Often the
states have not realized the full impact of the federal government's
maintenance of quasi-sovereign units located inside their boundaries.
By federal law, tribal governments displace state power to a large ex-
tent, often over a large portion of a state. The states have sometimes
tried to ignore this fact, or have acted on the assumption that the spe-
cial status of the tribes would soon disappear.277 This attitude has im-
peded full recognition of the effect on state interests that results from
the unique status of the tribes.
Although the continuation of tribal sovereignty is made possible
by federal law, and although it was a product of a vital federal interest
in the formative years of the nation, it is not a constitutionally required
principle.278 Tribal sovereignty is an issue that affects vital state inter-
ests as well as federal interests. The political-question doctrine, oper-
ating at the federal level, may require that there be some difference
between fifth-amendment and fourteenth-amendment standards of ju-
dicial review, but in Indian affairs, unlike the regulation of aliens, the
states are not without valid legislative interests of their own.
Summary and Application
Based upon the preceding discussion of possible restrictions on
state and local action, it might be hypothesized that such action will be
upheld if it first meets the threshold test of consistency with federal
laws which promote tribal sovereignty and establish individual Indian
rights. If the action is found to conflict with federal regulation, the
275. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).
276. See notes 146-220 & accompanying text supra.
277. Of course, congressional policies such as allotment and termination have at times
fueled such expectations. The judiciary often responded during periods of such congres-
sional attitudes with decisions reflecting an assimilationist approach, sometimes with express
reliance upon trends in federal legislation. See, e.g., Acosta v. County of San Diego, 126
Cal. App. 2d 455, 272 P.2d 92 (1954).
278. See notes 5-54 & accompanying text supra.
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court will not reach the equal-protection issue. If the state law is found
to be consistent with federal legislation, it must meet the equal protec-
tion standards delineated above: the action will be upheld if it is (1) not
a pretext for racial discrimination, (2) not a denial of a fundamental
right, (3) narrowly drawn to apply only to persons who come within the
unique federal legal status, such as members of tribes on reservations,
and (4) rationally related to legitimate state interests. There exists a
small but representative sampling of recent lower court case law
against which this standard may be evaluated.
The first test, federal preemption of state action, was held disposi-
tive by the Eighth Circuit in Chase v. McMasters.279 The lower court
in that case had held that a city's policy of not connecting municipal
sewer and water systems to a tract acquired and held in trust for indi-
vidual Indians under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act was not un-
constitutional.280 The court found no intent to discriminate by
pretextual use of the trust-land distinction. In line with Mancari and
Antelope, the court next found that the trust-land classification was not
a racial classification, thus addressing the second and third factors
above. Finally, the court found the distinction to be rationally related
to the governmental purpose of providing municipal water and sewer
systems, because the trust land was exempt from normal real-property
taxation.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, not on the ground that the
district court was incorrect as to any of the factors it applied, but on the
ground that it had overlooked the threshold issue of federal preemp-
tion. The court held that the city's policy was void under the
supremacy clause because it interfered with a federally guaranteed
right of individual Indians to enjoy the beneficial use of trust property
without paying taxes. 28'
The supremacy of conflicting federal law also was controlling in
White v. Califano,28 2 which upheld a state's policy of refusing admis-
sion to its mental hospital to reservation Indians. The court observed
that for the state to exercise mental-commitment jurisdiction over res-
ervation Indians would infringe upon tribal self-government. Thus, its
concommitant denial of services also had to be upheld, and the court
did not reach the remaining factors listed above relating to equal pro-
279. 573 F.2d i01 (8th Cir. 1978).
280. 405 F. Supp. 1297 (D.N.D. 1975).
281. 573 F.2d at 1018. But see City of Tacoma v. Andrus, Civ. No. 77-1423 (D.D.C.,
Jan. 20, 1978) (opposite conclusion).
282. 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977).
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tection considerations. 283
Pretextual discrimination was considered by the district court in
Chase, as noted above, and by the court of appeals. 284 It was also
considered in Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion v. Washington,285 where the court found that the state legislation
"was not adopted to mask racial discrimination." 286
In Chase, Yakima Nation and the North Dakota Supreme Court
case of Lohnes v. Cloud,287 various state and local classifications were
held not be invidious or to affect a fundamental right, the third factor
listed above. The fourth factor, which requires that the category of
state interest be narrowly drawn, has not received attention because it
appears that no state or local government has classified simply on the
basis of Indian versus non-Indian. In the recently reported cases, the
legislative classifications in question have been reservation Indians, 288
occupants of trust land289 or holders of tribal-court judgments. 290
The fifth factor, the rational-basis test, arose in Yakima Nation29'
and the lower court decision in Chase.292 In Chase, the district court
found a rational relationship between the trust-land/fee-land distinc-
tion and the provision of municipal sewer and water services, 293 but the
court of appeals indicated that it would probably not have found a ra-
tional basis, had it reached the question.294
The distinction between trust land and fee land was also at issue in
Yakima Nation.295 There state legislation extended Public Law 280
criminal jurisdiction296 to fee land in Indian country but not to trust
land. The court found that there was no rational relationship between
the trust-land/fee-land distinction and the legislative purpose of pro-
283. Id. at 548-51.
284. 573 F.2d 1011, 1019 n.8 (8th Cir. 1978).
285. 552 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), prob.juris. noted, 434 U.S. 811 (1977).
286. Id. at 1334.
287. 254 N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1977).
288. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977).
289. Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1978); Confederated Bands and Tribes
of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 552 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), prob.juris. noted, 434
U.S. 811 (1977).
290. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 550-51 (D.S.D. 1977); Lohnes v. Cloud, 254
N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1977).
291. 552 F.2d at 1335-36.
292. 405 F. Supp. at 1301-02.
293. Id.
294. 573 F.2d 1011, 1018 n.7 (8th Cir. 1978).
295. 552 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), prob.juris. noted, 434 U.S. 811 (1977).
296. See note 43 supra.
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viding adequate law enforcement. 297
In Lohnes v. Cloud298 the North Dakota Supreme Court inter-
preted a state statute allowing for collection of an automobile-accident
judgment from a state Unsatisfied Judgment Fund to exclude claims
made by plaintiffs who had obtained judgments in tribal courts rather
than in state court. Relying on Antelofpe, the court correctly found that
the classification was not based upon race.299 But the court did not
actually follow through by then applying the rational-basis test, though
it did list policy considerations that supported its holding. Because
Indians were not exempted from contributing to the fund,3°° there was,
arguably, no rational basis for excluding the tribal court judgment
holders from the benefits of the fund.
Finally, a rational basis was found for benign state legislation in
the field of Indian affairs in Forge v. Minnesota.301 The Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld a state law that imposed a license fee on non-
Indian fishermen on the ground that it was a rational compromise be-
tween Indian treaty rights and legitimate state interests in regulating
fishing.30 2
In all three of these cases, the courts did not apply the compelling-
state-interest test, and in two of them the courts rigorously applied the
rational-basis test. Consideration of all cases cited in this section indi-
cates that the courts, for the most part, apply the analysis delineated
above for state classifications in Indian affairs.
Conclusion
In each of the three lines of cases examined, specific conclusions
about the proper role of sovereignty can be pulled together to form a
unified view of sovereignty in the field of Indian law. Sovereignty is, in
essence, a legal status held in varying degrees by Indian tribes in Amer-
ican Indian law. The tribes do not have a constitutional right to main-
tain this status, nor do they have a constitutional right to exercise any
powers or other attributes of sovereignty. Sovereignty is not a direct
source of tribal powers; except for certain implied powers not specifi-
297. 552 F.2d at 1335.
298. 254 N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1977).
299. Id. at 434; see text accompanying note 238 supra.
300. Contributions were made by paying an additional fee to obtain a driver's license;
thus Indians contributed to the same extent as non-Indians. Id. at 437.
301. 262 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 1977).
302. Id. at 347-48.
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cally withdrawn by the federal government, there must be a facilitating
federal treaty or statute for each tribal power.
Federal law may foster, regulate, limit or completely terminate tri-
bal sovereignty. Federal legislation regulating tribes and their mem-
bers is not racially discriminatory and must only be supported by a
rational basis.
Such federal laws may be a direct result of the original sovereign
status of the tribes, and may be simply a recognition or a consent to the
continuance of original tribal powers. Moreover, the retention of sov-
ereign powers will frequently be inferred from treaties and statutes
which do not expressly confer particular powers. The prefederal exter-
nal sovereignty of the tribes provides a backdrop for interpretation, a
backdrop that favors a finding of implied tribal power. The dimin-
ished status of the tribes within the federal system provides a counter-
vailing historical backdrop, especially restrictive of tribal power when
exercised over non-Indians.
Where there is an express or implied conferral or recognition of
tribal sovereignty in federal law, that sovereignty preempts inconsistent
state authority. Under the prevailing interpretations of federal law,
states will frequently be preempted with respect to matters involving
reservation Indians. State and local governments are, however, able to
respond to this situation with reasonable legislative and administrative
action to accommodate their needs and carry out their responsibilities
under federal law. States are on more solid legal ground if they accept
as permanent the preemptive federal policies which favor tribal self-
government and adjust to them with legislation that minimizes the re-
sulting economic and jurisdictional burdens.
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